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Chopping	the	world	into	bits:	object-relations	theory	and	the	good	
governance	norm	
	
	
	
	
Abstract		This	article	explores	the	way	in	which	idealized	norms	are	promoted	by	international	organizations	(IOs)	to	establish	a	sense	of	self-certainty.	I	argue	that	this	is	necessary	because	it	masks	an	anxiety	about	the	coherence	and	wholeness	of	such	organizations.	Using	psychoanalytic	object-relations	theory,	I	explore	the	ways	in	which	one	norm	–	that	of	good	governance	–	splits	the	world	up	into	good	and	bad	objects.	In	doing	this,	it	enables	the	subject	(the	World	Bank	and	other	donors)	to	transcend	the	discomfort	of	ambiguity	by	creating	a	sense	of	clarity	about	the	way	the	world	is	populated	by	unambiguously	good	and	bad	objects.	Such	a	process	can	be	thought	of	as	one	in	which	uncertainty	about	the	self	is	avoided	through	simplified	and	morally	certain	depictions	of	the	other.	‘Ideal	norms’	enable	IOs	to	pursue	their	work	with	moral	vigour	and	certainty,	and	to	represent	a	collective	good	object.	Object-relations	theory	as	a	way	to	understand	norms	highlights	first,	their	significance	as	idealizations	for	individuals;	second,	their	clumsiness	in	defining	and	categorizing	the	world’s	objects;	and	third,	the	challenges	they	pose	to	the	flexibility	and	maturity	of	IOs.				
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Chopping	the	world	into	bits:	Africa,	the	World	Bank	and	the	good	
governance	norm	
		This	article	explores	norms	as	idealizations,	in	an	attempt	to	grasp	their	significance	as	projects	for	international	organizations	(IOs).	We	can	think	about	norms	as	‘standards	of	proper	behaviour’	(Katzenstein,	1996:	5).	In	this	sense	they	are	somehow	natural,	things	to	be	taken	for	granted,	noticed	only	really	when	they	are	absent.	We	can	also	think	about	norms	as	‘understandings	about	what	is	good	and	appropriate’	(Finnemore,	1996:	2).	In	this	sense,	norms	embody	a	stronger	sense	of	virtue	and	an	ability	to	enable	progress	or	improvement.	Norms	become	ideal	when	they	are	able	to	conflate	what	is	good	with	what	is	appropriate,	standard	or	proper.	It	is	when	the	good	becomes	‘natural’	that	a	norm	appears	immanent	and	non-contestable,	and	so	acquires	an	idealized	form.1	Along	with	the	other	articles	in	this	special	issue,	I	will	attempt	to	challenge	some	of	the	complacency	surrounding	the	apparent	naturalness	and	universality	of	norms	employed	in	international	relations.		I	explore	the	‘naturalness’	of	idealized	norms,	think	about	how	their	incontestability	is	achieved,	and	why	this	matters	to	those	who	subscribe	to	them.	Using	psychoanalytic	object-relations	theory,	I	will	argue	that	idealized	norms	work	by	breaking	the	world	up,	splitting	complex	political	wholes	into	bits	that	are	idealized	as	wholly	‘good’	and	wholly	‘bad’.	I	will	examine	why	such	processes	occur,	and	the	implications	of	such	processes	for	the	identity	of	norm-promoting	organizations,	their	objects,	the	focus	of	socialization,	and	for	the	relationship	between	the	two.			To	make	my	argument,	I	will	concentrate	on	one	norm,	that	of		‘good	governance’,	an	approach	to	development	adopted	from	the	1990s	by	the	World		1	Accounts	of	this	include	Epstein’s	work	on	anti-whaling	norms	in	which	she	describes	how	a	norm	changes	from	a	political	project	into	a	taken	for	granted	‘truth’	(Epstein,	2008);	and	Klotz’s	depiction	of	the	anti-racist	norm,	employed	in	the	battle	to	end	Apartheid	in	South	Africa,	as	embodiment	of	absolute	‘good’	versus	absolute	‘bad’	(Klotz,	1995:	14).	
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Bank,	and	now	established	as	the	dominant	development	blueprint	among	western	donors.	In	the	last	20	years	the	Bank	has	developed	good	governance	as	a	technocratic	guide	to	governing		(World	Bank	1994;	1997;	2002;	2008).	It	rests	on	the	assumption	that	poverty	arises	from	inadequate	governance	structures	and	mechanisms,	and	that	these	can	be	corrected	by	the	implementation	of	market-based	economic	and	political	reforms	which	should	be	taught	to	poor	countries.	Good	governance	is	a	very	successful	and	widely	accepted	norm	(Abrahamsen,	2004),	and	also	one	that	in	its	apparent	incontestability,	or	‘naturalness’,	has	achieved	an	idealized	status.	The	agenda	is	based	on	the	idea	that	governance	reforms	are	‘natural	because	they	are	the	product	of	an	economic	rationality	inherent	in	all	persons’	(Williams,	1999:	79),	and	has	become	‘the	pursuit	of	a	very	detailed	programme	of	transformation	targeted	at	government,	institutions,	and	the	habits,	attitudes,	and	mores	of	persons’	(Ibid,	98).	I	will	concentrate	on	the	way	in	which	good	governance	is	framed	and	used	in	the	context	of	African	countries	many	of	which,	as	some	of	the	most	substantial	recipients	of	development	aid	and	policy,	have	been	subjected	to	it	for	the	best	part	of	two	decades.		The	very	clear	way	in	which	the	Bank	approaches	the	good	governance	programme	in	Africa,	in	particular	its	understanding	of	the	good	and	bad	objects	it	encounters	in	its	activities,	lend	themselves	particularly	well	to	an	object-relations	analysis.	The	theory	was	framed	by	psychoanalyst	Melanie	Klein	who	used	it	to	explain	the	way	in	which	individuals	construct	themselves	in	relation	to	the	world.	It	is	rooted	in	mechanisms	of	what	Kleinian	psychoanalysts	call	‘projective	identification’,	in	which	an	individual	both	‘gets	rid	of	whatever	is	a	painful	or	bad	experience	by	trying	to	project	it	outside	into	the	object,	thereby	increasing	the	badness	of	the	object’,	and	similarly,	projects	‘parts	of	the	self	felt	as	good	and	constructive…	into	a	good	object,	making	it	more	ideal’	(Segal,	2006:	95).	Projective	identification	happens	in	an	attempt	to	avoid	the	‘psychic	discomfort’	that	would	be	caused	by	a	recognition	of	internal	ambivalence,	and	it	involves	a	splitting	apart	of	whole,	complex	objects	and	the	creation	of	idealized	
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good	and	bad	objects	as	a	way	to	reaffirm	moral	certainty.2	I	use	Klein’s	theory	to	shed	light	on	the	complex	forms	of	splitting	at	work	in	the	good	governance	project;	and	then	in	the	universalized	norms	that	represent	a	need	to	overcome	(or	to	cover	up)	disturbing	ambivalence.			This	theme	of	ambivalence	is	one	that	has	been	tackled	within	postcolonial	IR	theory	particularly	directly	by	Homi	Bhabha.	In	his	essay	‘Sly	Civility’,	for	example,	he	explores	the	confusion	of	Victorian	liberalism	in	relation	to	empire,	arguing	that	the	inconsistency	between	the	values	of	individual	freedom	as	the	basis	for	progress	and	advocacy	of	colonial	despotism	(found	explicitly	in	the	work	on	J.	S.	Mill)	reflects	a	troubled	ambivalence	at	the	heart	of	the	colonial	project.	Colonial	discourse	attempts	to	express	distance	from	the	terror	of	ambiguity	by	positing		‘strategic	splitting	of	the	colonial	discourse’.	Differences	are	subsumed	in	a	simplified	mapping	of	the	world	of	the	colonized.	‘It	is	this	image	of	India	as	a	primordial	fixity	–	as	narcissistic	inverted	other	–	that	satisfies	the	self-fulfilling	prophecy	of	Western	progress	and	stills,	for	a	while,	the	supplementary	signifier	of	colonial	discourse’	(Bhabha,	1994:	139).		Following	in	this	vein,	my	argument	also	delves	into	the	way	poorer	parts	of	the	world	are	mapped	out	in	simplified,	idealized	ways.	In	the	World	Bank	discourse	on	Africa,	for	example,	splitting	takes	place	on	several	different	planes.	We	can	see	splits	created	between	the	self	and	other	in	the	way	Bhabha	suggests,	but	also	between	different	African	subjects;	alongside	malignant	African	actors	are	also	idealized	‘good’	actors,	the	‘innately	capitalist’	individuals	that	make	up	civil	society,	or	the	‘progressive	drivers	of	change’	that	struggle	against	the	apparent	backwardness	and	inertia	in	African	political	systems.	The	degree	to	which	this		2	The	psychoanalytic	term	‘object’	is	a	useful	one	for	IR.	It	can	be	used	to	mean	‘other’,	in	the	sense	that	other	is	demarcated	as	separate,	different,	outside;	but	it	also	carries	an	understanding	of	the	‘other’	as	connected	to	the	self,	in	that	it	is	defined	as	a	way	to	establish	the	self.	Object-relations	theory	deals	with	internal	and	external	objects	which	together	constitute	the	self.	It	describes	a	process	whereby	all	objects,	although	mutually	constitutive,	can	be	imagined	as	completely	separate.	This	resonates	with	constructivist	debates	around	the	constitution	of	‘things’	(Jackson,	2004)	and	‘individuals’	(Emirbayer,	1997)	as	embedded	within	relationships.	
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mapping	enables	the	World	Bank	to	overcome	internal	ambivalence	is	explored	at	the	end	of	the	article.			Three	themes	run	through	the	paper.	First,	why	might	projective	identification	take	place;	second,	how	do	projection	and	idealization	create	objects	in	international	politics;	and	third,	how	do	such	processes	impact	on	the	IOs	that	promote	‘ideal	norms’.	The	first	explores	the	ways	in	which	the	emotional	wellbeing	and	identity	of	those	who	shape	and	promote	particular	norms,	as	well	as	all	those	who	unthinkingly	subscribe	to	them,	are	at	stake	in	the	processes	of	norm	creation	and	diffusion.	Blaney	and	Inayatullah	refer	to	the	‘ethical	heroism	of	norms	constructivism’	(Blaney	and	Inayatullah,	2012),	arguing	that	constructivists	continually	emphasize	the	diffusion	of	good	or	improving	norms,	and	ignore	bad	or	degenerate	norms.	This	process	they	call	‘projected	deflection’,	an	attempt	to	distance	oneself	from	the	bad	by	displacing	it	onto	another,	who	becomes	the	object	of	one’s	rescue	or	reform	through	socialization.	The	Kleinian	perspective	enables	us	to	explore	these	ideas	of	deflection	and	displacement.	More,	it	shows	the	ways	in	which	displacement,	projection	and	idealization	are	not	just	a	way	to	make	one	feel	better,	or	present	a	cleaner	self-image,	but	represent	far	deeper,	and	probably	unavoidable,	processes	of	ego-formation.			The	second	opens	up	to	question	the	way	in	which	those	(more	powerful)	parts	of	the	world	that	shape	and	promote	norms	define	the	(less	powerful)	rest.	Object-relations	theory	explores	this	dismissal	of	the	complexities	of	objects	by	describing	how	norms	can	split	the	world	into	part-objects,	made	to	fit	categories	that	relate	to	the	preoccupations	and	identities	of	norms-shapers.	How	safe,	therefore,	are	the	definitions	and	delineations	established	by	norms,	particularly	from	the	perspective	of	those	targeted	by	them?	As	an	example	of	this,	Epstein	suggests	that	for	the	socializee,	socialization	is	characterized	by	loss	rather	than	the	neutral	change	that	is	often	assumed	in	the	literature.	She	points	out	that	values	and	meanings	attached	to	‘undesirable’	practices	can	only	be	relinquished	with	pain,	and	that	the	‘political	costs	incurred	in	processes	of	identity	change’	are	continually	underestimated	(Epstein,	2012).	This	is	a	reminder	of	the	ways	intrusive	and	controlling	definitions	of	‘them’	in	relation	to	
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‘us’	saturate	the	language	of	norms	and	socialization,	and	continually	overlook	and	seek	to	overturn	political	and	social	relationships	and	meanings	that	don’t	conform	to	the	dominant	normative	agenda.			Finally,	the	third	theme	explores	the	ways	in	which	IOs	that	work	with	ideal	norms	are	constrained	in	the	ways	they	can	‘see’	and	engage	with	the	world.	Object-relations	theory	suggests	that	an	inability	to	grasp	objects	as	whole	and	complex	is	related	to	an	inability	to	grasp	the	self	as	whole	and	integrated.	I	will	suggest	that	an	analogy	can	be	drawn	with	IOs	that	cannot	‘see’	the	world	in	its	complexity	because	they	are	predicated	on	an	idealized	self-image.	The	inability	to	let	go	of	this	idealized	self-image	then	prevents	more	mature	engagement	with	the	world,	inhibiting	the	purported	ambitions	of	the	organization.		 	The	article	proceeds	as	follows.	First,	I	outline	Klein’s	theory.	Next	I	discuss	the	good	governance	agenda,	describing	its	basic	assumptions	and	exploring	these	in	the	light	of	object-relations	theory.	In	particular,	I	look	at	the	way	the	good	governance	discourse	establishes	good	and	bad	objects.	Finally,	in	the	conclusion	I	suggest	that	the	World	Bank,	by	using	the	norm	of	good	governance	in	this	way,	is	able	to	embody	certainty	about	the	world,	and	to	avoid	the	anxieties	connected	with	complexity.	This	has	profound	implications	for	the	scope	and	capacity	of	the	Bank,	whose	function	and	identity	has	been	infused	with	its	promotion	of	such	a	norm,	and	for	the	bits	of	the	world	that	are	chopped	and	ordered	by	it	in	the	process.				
Klein’s	world	of	objects	
	One	of	Klein’s	key	contributions	to	psychoanalysis	was	object-relations	theory,	the	idea	that	individual	subjectivity	develops	through	relations	between	internal	and	external	objects.	Internal	objects,	defined	by	John	Bowlby,	are	‘internal	working	models’.	‘Each	individual	builds	working	models	of	the	world	and	of	himself	in	it,	with	the	aid	of	which	he	perceives	events,	forecasts	the	future,	and	constructs	his	plans’	(Bowlby,	1973:	203).	External	objects	are	the	things	the	
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individual	encounters	in	the	world.	Internal	and	external	objects	are	constantly	compared	and	altered	in	relation	to	each	other	through	the	individual’s	experience	and	engagement	in	the	world:	Klein’s	understanding	of	object	relations	is	not	simply	about	a	series	of	adjustments	between	inner	and	outer	worlds,	but	about	the	way	in	which	each	creates	the	other.	Because	of	this,	the	self	and	the	other	are	mutually	constitutive,	and	relationships	themselves	are	foundational	of	individual	identity.		Klein	argued	that	the	process	of	constructing	internal	and	external	objects	begins	with	the	separation	of	aggression	and	love,	and	is	then	realized	through	their	projection	onto	external	objects.	Thus	she	discusses	processes	of	splitting	and	projecting	internal	fears,	fantasies	and	emotions	onto	external	objects	which	are	encountered	and	reintrojected	to	form	and	reform	internal	objects.	The	processes	begin	with	the	new-born	infant.	At	first,	the	infant	cannot	distinguish	between	itself	and	the	outside	world.	It	experiences	inside	and	outside	together,	in	bits,	as	wholly	idealized	good	or	aggressive	part-objects.	These	engender	either	extreme	feelings	of	love	and	security,	or	of	hatred	and	destructiveness.	The	distinction	between	‘inside’	and	‘outside’	remains	unclear:	it	is	as	if	the	external	objects	are	under	the	control	of	the	baby,	but	also	part	of	it.	The	baby	experiences,	attempts	to	control	and	feels	overwhelmed	by	good	and	bad	objects	all	at	once.			The	tendency	for	the	self	(or	ego)	to	split	itself	and	its	objects	‘occurs	in	part	because	the	ego	largely	lacks	cohesion	at	birth,	and	in	part	because	it	constitutes	a	defence	against	the	primordial	anxiety,	and	is	therefore	a	means	of	preserving	the	ego’	(Klein,	1997a:	191).	Projection	allows	a	sense	of	distancing.	‘The	fear	of	the	destructive	impulse	seems	to	attach	itself	at	once	to	an	object	–	or	rather	it	is	experienced	as	the	fear	of	an	uncontrollable	overpowering	object’	(Klein,	1997b:	4).	Destructive	fantasies	stemming	from	the	innate	death	instinct	are	projected	onto	external	objects	which	are	then	experienced	as	powerful	and	frightening.	In	this	way,	aggression	is	expelled	and	then	re-encountered,	coming	now	from	external	objects.	At	the	same	time,	emotions	of	love	and	good,	which	arise	from	the	life	instinct,	are	projected	onto	external	objects	which	are	then	encountered	
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as	loving.	Klein	argues	that	in	this	state	which	she	calls	‘paranoid-schizoid’,	splitting	and	projecting	good	and	bad	onto	principally	the	mother	leads	the	infant	to	experience	‘two’	mothers,	one	wholly	good	and	one	wholly	bad,	in	a	way	that	appears	manageable	(Klein,	1998a:	290-1).			Only	towards	the	middle	of	the	first	year	of	life	does	the	infant	begin	to	put	disaggregated	objects	together,	to	comprehend	the	ambiguity	of	whole	objects,	internal	and	external.	The	mother,	for	example,	is	gradually	realized	not	to	be	two	mothers	but	one	that	is	both	loved	and	hated.	With	the	realization	of	the	ambiguity	of	objects,	the	child	reaches	a	crucial	stage	in	emotional	development,	which	Klein	called	the	‘depressive	position’,	in	which	destructive	fantasies	in	relation	to	vital	good	objects	are	acknowledged.	Kristeva	describes	the	depressive	position	as	an	acceptance	of	‘psychic	discomfort’.	‘Anxiety	has	not	disappeared,	as	it	is	always	present	with	Klein,	but	it	chooses	another	domain:	rather	than	splitting	or	fragmenting	and	rather	than	destroying	and	tearing	into	pieces,	anxiety	is	tolerated	as	a	source	of	pain	relating	to	the	Other	and	a	source	of	guilt	about	having	taken	pleasure	in	hurting	him’	(Kristeva,	2001:	89).		If	the	depressive	position	is	acknowledged,	the	child	can	develop	richer	and	more	complex	object	relations,	in	which	whole	internal	objects	are	reinforced	by	an	engagement	with	the	world.	The	acceptance	of	guilt,	leading	to	a	piecing	together,	repair	and	introjection	of	ambiguous	objects	enables	the	child	to	develop	more	balanced,	integrated	relationships	with	the	outside	world,	and	an	ongoing	acceptance	of	‘psychic	discomfort’.	Mature	relationships	in	which	the	other	is	allowed	to	be	complex	and	ambiguous	thus	enable	and	are	enabled	by	an	acceptance	of	the	wholeness	but	also	complexity	of	the	self.		For	Klein,	this	is	not	a	‘stage’	to	be	resolved	once	and	for	all,	but	a	series	of	processes	that	can	repeat	throughout	life.3	She	traces	the	ways	in	which	older	children	and	adults	continue	to	split	apart	internal	objects	and	project	them	onto		3	Klein	uses	‘positions’	rather	than	Freudian	‘stages’	to	emphasize	that	these	phenomena	are	not	to	be	resolved	as,	for	example,	Freudian	phases.	Klein’s	term	refers	to	particular	configurations	of	object	relations,	anxieties	and	defences	which	persist	throughout	life.	(Segal,	1997:	ix).		
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external	objects	as	a	way	of	protecting	internal	objects	against	their	own	feelings	of	aggression	and	destructiveness.	‘Bad’	objects	can	be	hated	more	safely	from	a	distance;	‘good’	objects	can	be	idealized	more	plausibly.	Thus	the	world	can	sometimes	appear	to	be	populated	by	an	assortment	of	good	people	and	noble	causes,	alongside	aggressive	and	hateful	figures.	Klein	argues	that	such	mechanisms	are	employed	in	order	to	keep	intimate	objects	–	those	that	are	most	closely	bound	up	with	the	internal	objects	that	constitute	the	self	–	safe	from	destructive	feelings.	‘This	division	between	love	and	hate	towards	people	not	too	close	to	oneself	also	serves	the	purpose	of	keeping	loved	people	more	secure,	both	actually	and	in	one’s	mind.	They	are	not	only	remote	from	one	physically	and	thus	inaccessible,	but	the	division	between	the	loving	and	hating	attitude	fosters	the	feeling	that	one	can	keep	love	unspoilt’	(Ibid).		Anxiety	caused	by	aggression	and	envy	continue	to	exist	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	throughout	life	and	Klein	thought	that	everyone	on	occasion	resorts	to	defensive	mechanisms	where	guilt	is	denied	and	envy	projected	through		‘projective	identification’.	Segal	describes	this	as	a	process	in	which	the	individual	‘gets	rid	of	whatever	is	a	painful	or	bad	experience	by	trying	to	project	it	outside	into	the	object,	thereby	increasing	the	badness	of	the	object.	And	similarly,	parts	of	the	self	felt	as	good	and	constructive	may	be	projected	into	a	good	object,	making	it	more	ideal	but	stripping	the	ego	of	its	potential’	(Segal,	2006:	95	–	my	emphasis).	The	ego’s	potential	lies,	for	Klein,	in	its	acknowledgement	of	anxiety	or	psychic	discomfort.	In	extreme	cases,	when	anxiety	is	overwhelming,	individuals	can	resort	to	a	paranoid-schizoid	position	in	which	splitting	and	projecting	ideal	(good	and	bad)	objects	become	the	only	way	they	can	deal	with	themselves	in	the	world.		A	defining	characteristic	of	idealized	objects	is	their	symbolic	role.	Making	symbols	is	an	essential	part	of	discovering	and	understanding	the	world.	It	necessarily	involves	some	splitting	and	shaping	of	external	objects	to	make	them	fit	and	reinforce	preconceived	ideas	(or	internal	objects).	An	acceptance	of	anxiety	and	uncertainty	allows	us	to	approach	this	task	with	flexibility,	to	recognize	when	external	objects	do	not	‘fit’,	and	to	constantly	reassess	and	
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recreate	symbols.	Problems	arise	when	anxiety	is	overwhelming	and	symbolization	becomes	fixed	or	rigid.	‘A	part	of	the	ego	becomes	identified	with	the	object	and,	as	a	consequence,	the	symbol	is	equated	with	the	thing	symbolized.	The	symbol	does	not	represent	the	object,	but	is	treated	as	though	it	
was	the	object’	(Segal,	19917:	43	–	my	emphasis).		As	Alford	suggests,	such	rigid	symbolism	means	that,	‘we	fail	to	learn	all	we	could	about	the	world	because	we	force	it	into	a	framework	determined	by	our	phantasies	and	needs,	giving	the	world	less	of	an	opportunity	to	modify	these	phantasies’	(Alford,	1989:	149).			Applying	the	object-relations	lens	to	norms	produces	two	observations.	First,	norms	as	an	expression	of	an	ideal	represent	a	form	of	rigid	symbolism	–	a	posited	universalism	enables	engagements	with	external	objects	in	a	literal	relation	to	internal	objects	by	subjecting	them	to	an	already	perfect	internal	structure.	Thus	norms	seem	to	order	and	rationalize	the	world,	making	it	appear	more	predictable,	manageable	and	less	frightening.	Through	rigid	symbolization,	the	other	becomes	an	expression	of	the	idealized	self.	Second,	the	power	of	norms,	which	are	social	creations,	is	magnified	because	they	are	joint	enterprises	that	collect	individuals	together	in	a	common	cause.	This	reinforces	the	sense	of	the	universal:	the	organization	can	be	an	expression	of	the	individual	writ-large,	a	super,	more	powerful	individual.	In	identifying	with	such	an	organization,	the	individual	is	affirmed	in	its	sense	of	itself	in	the	world,	and	of	the	wider	certainty	of	its	objects.	The	role	of	IOs	in	pulling	together	an	ideal	sense	of	the	individual	writ-large,	of	projecting	onto	the	world	clear-cut	and	certain	categories,	provides	psychological	underpinning	to	individuals	that	belong	to	or	identify	with	it.4		Relating	this	to	the	identity	and	wellbeing	of	individuals,	the	construction	of	norms’	objects	and	the	constraints	on	organizations	that	promote	them	–	it	could	be	argued	that	defensive	splitting	and	projecting	of	very	idealized	good	and	bad		4	Some psychoanalysts have attempted to extrapolate individual ego-formation onto 
groups – mirroring similar attempts in IR (Wendt, 2004). Bion’s work, for example, 
suggests that the unconscious dynamics in groups can lead to forms of group 
idealization or denial in ways similar to those developed by individuals (1974).  Others 
have explored these ideas in discussions of politics and war (Gallagher, 2011; Segal, 
1997).  	
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onto	external	objects	produces	two	effects.	First,	it	limits	the	subject’s	potential	for	engaging	with	the	complexities	and	ambiguities	of	the	world,	and	therefore	of	realizing	more	complex	internal	objects.	This	has	profound	implications	for	the	IO	that	serves	up	certainty	in	this	way.	Such	a	simplified,	rigid	division	of	the	world	into	idealized	objects	suggests	an	investment	in	an	idealized	image	for	such	an	organization,	and	an	inability	for	it	to	recognize	its	own	ambiguous	wholeness.	Second,	it	forces	external	objects	into	rigid	categories	that	are	over-determined	by	the	subject’s	internal	objects.	Such	misrepresentations	work	to	reinforce	the	power	disparities	found	in	relationships	between	large	powerful	IOs	and	the	countries	they	work	with.	In	the	next	section	I	will	consider	these	effects	through	an	exploration	of	the	World	Bank’s	good	governance	programme	in	sub-Saharan	Africa.			
Good	governance:	chopping	Africa	into	bits		Good	governance	is	an	agenda	of	best	political	practice	designed	to	promote	economic	development.	The	World	Bank	employs	this	norm	in	its	work	with	developing	countries,	using	it	to	define	what	has	gone	wrong	with	the	role	and	work	of	the	state,	and	to	devise	ways	to	make	it	work	better.	The	concept	was	first	developed	in	the	Bank’s	1989	report,	Sub-Saharan	Africa:	from	crisis	to	
sustainable	growth,	as	a	response	to	the	continent’s	particularly	poor	development	record	throughout	the	1980s	(Maldonado,	2010:	4).	Governance	was	presented	as	a	major	shift	in	the	Bank’s	approach	to	development,	one	that	replaced	its	previous	structural	adjustment	paradigm	rooted	in	a	more	simplistic	idea	that	states	are	bad	and	should	be	cut	back,	to	one	which	argued	that	states	are	vital	for	development,	that	some	states	are	good	and	others	are	bad,	and	that	it	is	possible	to	turn	bad	states	into	good	states.			In	this	section	I	do	three	things.	First,	drawing	on	its	own	policy	literature	and	that	of	supporting	organizations,	I	describe	the	World	Bank’s	understanding	of	good	governance.	Second,	I	discuss	some	of	the	critical	literature	on	good	governance	that	highlights	the	ways	in	which	the	Bank	simplifies	the	political	
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context	within	which	it	works.	And	third,	I	bring	object-relations	theory	into	the	discussion	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	such	simplifications	are	predicated	on	three	discursive	and	ideational	splits	which	create	separate	and	idealized	good	and	bad	objects.		Governance	has	become	the	lever	by	which	the	World	Bank	identifies	development	failure	and	prescribes	remedies	for	it.	‘The	clamor	for	greater	government	effectiveness	has	reached	crisis	proportions	in	many	developing	countries	where	the	state	has	failed	to	deliver	even	such	fundamental	public	goods	as	property	rights,	roads,	and	basic	health	and	education’	(World	Bank,	1997:	21).	States	with	low	capacity	need	to	get	the	‘fundamentals’	right,	‘without	which	sustainable,	shared,	poverty-reducing	development	is	impossible’	(Ibid:	23).	The	fundamentals	include:	‘establishing	a	foundation	of	law,	maintaining	a	non-distortionary	policy	environment,	including	macroeconomic	stability,	investing	in	basic	social	services	and	infrastructure,	protecting	the	vulnerable	and	protecting	the	environment’	(Ibid).	The	key	priorities	of	public	policy	reform	that	dominate	the	good	governance	agenda	are	‘reducing	corruption,	strengthening	civil	society,	and	reducing	poverty’	(World	Bank,	2001).		Good	governance	has	been	a	successful	norm	in	terms	of	its	uptake	by	a	wide	range	of	donors,	including	western	states,	multilateral	donors	and	international	non-governmental	organisations	(Abrahamsen,	2000:	48).	Unlike	the	Bank’s	previous	structural	adjustment	policies,	which	remained	contested,	good	governance	has	succeeded	in	normative	terms	by	becoming	the	unquestioned	prescription	to	promote	development	in	poor	countries.	Such	a	shared	agenda	necessarily	expresses	a	sense	of	a	universal	good,	and	the	good	governance	approach	does	this	by	presenting	the	business	of	governance	as	a	neutral,	essentially	technical	exercise	involving	a	set	of	institutions	and	practices	that	can	be	applied	anywhere	in	the	world.	‘A	crucial	part	of	the	justification	of	the	Bank’s	activities	is	that	economic	relations	are	natural,	hence	aiding	their	development	is	not	imposing	its	own	conception	of	the	good	but	rather	assisting	in	what	is	a	natural	course	of	development’	(Williams,	1999:	81).		
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Together,	donors	attempt	to	transfuse	these	principles	into	outlier	states,	bringing	them	into	the	international	fold	through	socialization.	For	example,	Britain’s	Department	for	International	Development	(DfID),	an	enthusiastic	promoter	of	the	good	governance	agenda,	argues	that	good	governance	policies	are	designed	to	bring	about	‘capable’	and	‘accountable’	governance,	and	that	‘this	is	largely	contingent	on	getting	the	right	kind	of	politics’	(DfID,	2009:	5).	And,	as	US	Secretary	of	State,	Hillary	Clinton	argued	on	a	visit	to	Nigeria	that:	‘the	most	immediate	source	of	the	disconnect	between	Nigeria’s	wealth	and	its	poverty	is	a	failure	of	governance	at	the	local,	state,	and	federal	level…	Without	good	governance,	no	amount	of	oil	or	no	amount	of	aid,	no	amount	of	effort	can	guarantee	Nigeria’s	success.	But	with	good	governance,	nothing	can	stop	Nigeria’	(Clinton,	2009).	Africa,	as	one	of	the	most	substantial	targets	of	development	funding	and	policy,	has	been	subjected	to	good	governance	reforms	for	the	best	part	of	two	decades	because,	from	the	perspective	of	donors,	‘institutions	in	Africa	have	not	yet	progressed	sufficiently	to	make	a	significant	contribution	to	development…	[they]	are	not	yet	strong	enough	to	permit	countries	to	continue	pursuing	appropriate	policies’	(Nsouli,	2001).			The	longevity	and	vigour	of	the	good	governance	programme	in	Africa	has	spawned	an	extensive	critical	literature	that	explores	the	effects	of	transplanting	a	supposedly	universal	norm	onto	African	contexts	(Williams	and	Young,	1994;	Williams,	1999;	Weiss,	2000;	Abrahamsen,	2000;	Kelsall,	2002;	Mkandawire,	2002;	Harrison,	2005,	for	example).	In	particular,	this	literature	deals	with	the	ways	in	which	the	World	Bank	and	other	donors	have	tended	to	simplify,	ignore	or	overlook	the	political	complexities	of	African	polities.	Kelsall	discusses	how	reforms,	which	appear	to	‘take	place	in	an	air-conditioned,	administrative	bubble,	isolated	from	the	political	atmosphere’,	potentially	disrupt	deeply	entrenched	interests	and	political	relationships	(2002:	605).	In	African	political	communities	and	wider	societies,	Harrison	argues,	‘individuals	are	not	isolated	and	utilitarian,	but	members	of	ethnically-defined	networks	of	power	and	mutual	support’	(2005:	253)	and	as	such	are	characterized	by	a	‘“rhizomatic”	form	of	power	that	pervades	society’	(Ibid:	252).	The	simplifications	of	the	good	governance	analysis	and	prescription	come	nowhere	close	to	getting	to	grips	
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with	these	complexities.	Instead,	it	has	been	suggested	that	they	better	represent	preoccupations	of	the	donors,	and	in	particular	donors’	desire	to	formulate	a	‘liberal	universalism’;	a	‘liberal	project’	which	seeks	to	remake	Africa	and	Africans	on	supposedly	neutral	liberal	lines	(Williams	and	Young,	1994;	Williams,	1999).			Digging	beneath	the	political	analyses	of	good	governance,	in	a	way	that	seeks	to	complement	rather	than	replace	them,	I	now	turn	to	the	ways	in	which	the	good	governance	agenda	can	be	understood	within	the	context	of	object	relations.	I	argue	that	good	governance	produces	discursive	and	ideational	splits	in	three	distinct	planes:	between	the	donor	and	the	recipient;	between	the	recipient	state	and	society;	and	between	individual	actors	within	the	recipient	state.	In	all	cases,	splitting	results	in	the	creation	of	apparently	wholly	good	and	wholly	bad	objects.			First,	the	good	governance	norm	reifies	a	split	between	a	principal,	the	donor	‘who	wants	“good	policies”’	and	the	agents,	the	recipient	regimes	which	are	‘deemed	to	be	self-serving	and	corrupt’	(Mkandawire,	2002:	15).	This	perception	was	the	basis	of	a	regime	of	conditionalities	whereby	recipient	regimes	were	expected	to	shift	economic	and	political	policy	in	order	to	secure	continuing	aid	(Ibid).	Mkandawire	argues	that	in	a	whole	range	of	donor	approaches	to	Africa’s	governance	problems,	this	differentiation	between	donor	and	recipient	is	constantly	reinforced:	‘In	the	culturalist	view,	African	states…	were	depicted	as	hopelessly	and	incurably	steeped	in	Africa’s	debilitating	culture…	From	an	economics	points	of	view,	African	institutions	were	infested	with	those	who	had	captured	state	policies	to	serve	their	narrow	interests	[while]	a	more	technocratic	view	questioned	the	analytic	capacity	and	the	bureaucratic	acumen	of	the	African	state’	(Ibid).	Whether	it	was	Africa’s	‘debilitating	culture’,	its	self-interested	elites	or	the	weak	analytic	capacity	of	its	bureaucrats,	African	countries	as	the	objects	of	development	reform	are	decayed,	corrupt	and	incapable.		
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In	such	rigid	symbolic	thinking	African	states	and	political	actors	become	straightforwardly	bad,	fitted	into	a	category	that	reinforces	the	subject’s		contrasting	goodness.	In	a	speech	he	made	in	Nigeria	on	good	governance	and	the	ways	in	which	the	World	Bank	was	supporting	transformation	in	Africa,	then	president	Paul	Wolfowitz	related	a	discussion	he	had	had	with	his	daughter	about	how	often	ordinary	Africans	greeted	him	in	public	places.			 My	daughter	said,	well	gee,	Dad,	I	don’t	think	that	there	are	more	than	20	people	in	the	United	States	who	would	recognize	you	as	the	president	of	the	World	Bank.	And	she	said,	it	must	be	because	the	World	Bank	is	so	important	for	Africa.	And	I	said,	yeah,	I	think	you’re	right.	And	I	remember	feeling	a	little	surge	of	pride	that	we	do	great	things	for	the	people	of	Africa.	(Wolfowitz,	2006)		Although	most	World	Bank	officials	would	adopt	a	less	overtly	self-congratulatory	tone,	Wolfowitz’s	story	distills	an	impression	of	‘good	works’	that	oozes	out	of	the	organization.	All	of	this	conveys	the	sense	of	a	very	clean	cut	between	donor	and	recipient,	overlooking	a	long,	and	often	fraught,	history	of	relationships	between	African	and	western	actors.			Second,	the	good	governance	agenda	creates	a	split	between	‘good’	society	and	individuals,	and	‘bad’	government.	This	is	rooted	in	‘an	artificial	dichotomy	…	between	“state”	and	“market”’	(Weiss,	2000:	803)	where	the	market	encompasses	civil	society,	NGOs,	and	forms	of	public	participation	that	can	hold	the	state	in	check.	Civil	society	is	the	primary	focus,	its	organizations	characterized	by	World	Bank	officials	as	‘institutions	that	exert	pressure	and	control	as	“watchdogs”	on	state	institutions	in	the	area	of	governance	and	development’	(Matovu,	2002).	In	this	depiction,	civil	society	carries	all	the	virtues	–	‘participation,	transparency,	accountability,	equity,	effectiveness	and	efficiency,	strategic	vision,	and	good	management’	(Ibid)	–	while	government	carries	all	the	vices	–	‘corruption,	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability,	poorly	designed	decentralization,	inadequate	service	delivery,	and	social	exclusion’	(Parker,	2001).	On	one	side,		‘the	poor,	needy,	and	powerless’;	on	the	other,	‘the	
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rich,	replete	and	dominant’	(Ibid).	Once	again,	this	approach	denies	the	complexity	outlined,	for	example,	in	Bayart’s	discussion	of	Africa’s	‘rhizome	states’	whose	roots	reach	down	into	society	(2009).		As	Abrahamsen	points	out,	this	discourse	‘constructs	a	binary	opposition	between	an	alien	state	intervention,	which	is	associated	with	past	development	failures,	and	an	“indigenous	capitalism”,	which	represents	the	basis	for	future	development	successes’	(2000:	50).	She	argues	that	the	World	Bank,	having	flattened	and	idealized	the	‘innate’	capitalist	instincts	of	ordinary	Africans,	constructs	‘an	essential	unity	of	purpose	…	between	the	development	apparatus	and	the	“ordinary	people”,	in	that	they	all	oppose	the	state	and	seek	to	reduce	it’	(Ibid:	52).	Civil	society’s	virtuous	actors		–	who	are	represented	as	‘undifferentiated	and	harmonious’	with	‘no	classes,	no	races,	no	genders,	[or]	ethnic	groups	of	oppressors’	(Ibid:	56)	–	confront	the	inertia,	corruption	and	vested	interests	of	government.	‘Citizens	demand	quality	services,	while	city	managers	lack	the	resources	and	morale	to	perform’	(Matovu,	2000).	All	the	energy,	initiative,	and	qualities	of	good	governance	are	on	the	side	of	civil	society,	while	government	is,	at	best,	tired	and	cash-strapped,	and	at	worst	‘using	communities	to	achieve	selfish	political	and	economic	gains’	(Ibid).		Third,	the	good	governance	agenda	splits	up	actors	within	states,	identifying	and	supporting	‘champions’	or	‘change	teams’	(Harrison,	2005:	247)	in	their	purported	struggle	with	‘predatory	local	elites’	(Mkandawire,	2002:	18).	DfID	has	been	particularly	attached	to	this	approach	which	has	been	called	‘Drivers	for	Change’	(DfID,	2004)	and	is	now	known	as	‘Political	Economy	Analysis’	(DfID,	2009).	The	approach	aims	to	‘get	beneath	the	formal	structures	to	reveal	the	underlying	interests,	incentives	and	institutions	that	enable	or	frustrate	change’	(Ibid:	1)	and	increasingly	‘is	being	used	to	identify	opportunities	for	leveraging	policy	change	and	supporting	reform’	(Ibid:	5-6).	It	builds	on	a	World	Bank	analysis	that	suggests	that	donors	must	get	past	the	evidence	of	failure,	to	explore	‘the	associated	institutional	set-up	and	governance	arrangements’	and	beneath	these,	the	sources	of	inertia	(Fritz,	Kaiser	and	Levy,	2009).	Political	reform	can	be	‘driven’	by	a	handful	of	enlightened	individuals	often	educated	in	
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the	west	who,	with	donor	support,	can	combat	inertia	and	bad	governance	and	realize	substantial	policy-reform	(Harris,	2013).	DfID,	in	advocating	this	approach,	encourages	its	officials	to	‘drill	down’	to	the	‘drivers	which	constrain	or	support	progressive	change’	(DfID,	2009:	13).		This	approach	fits	into	broader	Bank	analyses	which	advocate	simplified	state	structures,	in	which	political	and	complex	bureaucratic	mechanisms	are	cut	up	into	discrete	units.	Within	state	institutions,	incentives	are	used	to	get	individuals	to	do	the	right	thing;	and	between	state	and	society,	transparency	and	freedom	of	information	enables	citizens	to	check	and	monitor	individual	representatives	and	officials.	A	further	favourite	theme	is	that	of	decentralization,	explored	in	a	2002	Development	Report:	‘Building	Institutions	for	Markets’	that	argued	that	decentralized	institutions	could	‘limit	the	state’s	capacity	for	arbitrary	action’	(World	Bank,	2002:	2).	In	this	document,	the	theme	of	corruption	‘a	tax	which	distorts	the	choice	between	activities	and	lowers	the	returns	to	public	and	private	investments’	(Ibid:	9)	is	addressed.	We	are	told	that	complex	regulation	and	closed	trade,	alongside	centralized	government,	weak	electoral	frameworks	and	a	lack	of	information	all	feed	corruption.	Here	is	the	strong	sense	that	complexity,	ambiguity,	and	the	sense	of	opacity	together	erode	governance.	The	World	Bank	instead	advocates	a	pared	down,	simplified	and	unambiguous	state	structure.		Such	simplifications	and	flattenings	make	the	programme	of	development	appear	more	straightforward,	but	they	cannot	in	fact	make	it	more	achievable.	Harris,	for	example,	notes	that	in	the	case	of	Sierra	Leone	which	has	had	intense	involvement	from	DfID,	there	is	little	evidence	that	individual	drivers	for	change	working	in	government	ministries	are	doing	much	more	than	exhausting	themselves	(Harris,	2013).	A	more	open	and	flexible	attempt	to	see	what	African	societies	are	like	would	reveal	a	more	complex	picture	in	which	state-society	relations	are	thickly	interwoven	(Mbembe,	2001;	Chabal	and	Daloz,	1999).	And	yet	the	Bank	and	other	donors	persist	in	their	characterizations	of	individual	Africans	as	virtuous	entrepreneurs	or	victims	who	are	‘just	like	us’	(Gallagher,	2011).	
	 18	
	The	Bank’s	approach	does	particular	violence	to	relationships	which	are	constantly	deconstructed	and	simplified.	Historical,	social	and	political	complexity	appear	to	lend	too	much	muddiness	to	the	straightforward	way	it	wants	to	see	the	world;	and	so,	the	Bank	chops	the	world	up	into	bits	through	the	norm	of	good	governance.	I	have	argued	that	this	is	possible	because	the	norm	is	constructed	as	ideal,	so	disallowing	room	for	uncertainty	and	ambiguity.	The	way	in	which	this	norm	is	viewed	as	both	good	and	self-evident	or	‘natural’	allows	only	one	way	to	structure	the	world.	This	is	an	example	of	rigid	symbolism,	one	in	which	the	Bank	creates	stark	and	idealized	objects	that	reflect	a	sense	of	the	Bank	itself	and	its	relationships	as	ideal.	
	
	
Conclusion		What	does	all	this	splitting	achieve?	A	running	theme	in	World	Bank	discussions	of	governance	is	the	problem	of	fragmented	donor	interventions	(World	Bank,	2008:	14).	It	recognizes	that	when	donors	contribute	large	amounts	of	aid	in	uncoordinated	ways,	this	can	create	more	messiness	and	retard	development.	The	Bank	argues	for	country-ownership	(an	abiding	theme	of	all	donors	in	recent	years)	but,	alongside	it,	a	single	global	agenda.	There	is	a	sense	that	aid	recipients	are	many	and	diverse,	but	the	‘international	community’	should	be	integrated,	somehow	able	to	gather	global	challenges	together.		I	have	argued	that	the	norm	of	good	governance	can	be	viewed,	not	as	a	smooth	diffusion	of	ideas	and	practices,	but	as	a	project	of	splitting	the	world	up	into	good	and	bad	bits	that	reify	and	repair	a	sense	of	the	good	self.		First,	it	brings	like-minded	western	donors	together	around	an	apparently	incontrovertible	principle	and	good	project.	Good	governance’s	technocratic	qualities	represent	a	transcendence	of	messy	politics	and	the	pursuit	of	a	disinterested	ambition	to	‘repair’	broken	states	and	economies.	Together	these	characteristics	create	the	sense	of	an	‘ideal’	international	community.	But	second,	this	ideal	community	is	built	on	the	back	of	a	split	up	world,	one	that	is	split,	first,	between	donors	and	
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recipients;	and	one	that,	second,	splits	recipient	governments	and	societies	into	good,	or	‘progressive’	actors,	and	bad	or	‘corrupt’	actors,	and	denies	local	political	or	social	meaning.	
		Norms,	I	suggest,	can	perform	a	particular	and	important	function	as	idealizations:	they	enable	subjects	to	construct	the	idea	of	a	more	certain,	morally	clear-cut	world	out	there	in	a	way	that	avoids	internal	discomfort.	What	is	the	cost	of	this,	the	practical	implications?	I	suggest	they	are	two-fold.	First,	in	terms	of	the	subject,	as	Segal	suggests,	projective	identification,	can	‘strip	the	ego	of	its	potential’	(Segal,	2006:	95).	In	this	case,	we	can	wonder	about	the	effects	of	idealization	on	the	IOs	that	have	been	set	up	to	explore	the	world	and	find	solutions	to	its	problems.	Such	a	rigid	engagement	compels	them	to	inflexibility	and	immaturity;	such	avoidance	of	‘psychic	discomfort’	dooms	them	to	continually	misunderstand	and	misrepresent	the	world.	Second,	African	‘objects’,	both	‘good’	and	‘bad’	–	are	clearly	compromised	by	a	relationship	that	currently	rests	on	purposes	that	serve	wholly	different	needs	and	interests	than	their	own.			The	challenge	then	would	be	to	explore	ways	in	which	IOs	might	be	brought	to	accept	internal	ambiguity,	a	more	messy	and	compromised	history	and	relationship	with	external	objects,	and	ultimately,	a	more	integrated	and	uncomfortable	role.	Such	a	project	would	be	of	importance	to	both	the	organizations	themselves,	and	to	their	objects	–	in	this	case	of	good	governance,	African	countries,	states	and	populations.	However,	object	relations	applied	here	suggests	that	the	social	construction	of	the	norm	of	good	governance	acts	as	a	defensive	mechanism	against	internal	ambivalence.	The	Bank’s	actors	and	spokespeople,	in	breaking	up	and	defining	African	countries	in	the	ways	described,	are	engaged	in	processes	of	projective	identification	that	enable	them	to	view	themselves,	their	organization,	its	project,	and	the	wider	‘international	community’,	in	idealized	ways.	This	is	an	idea	of	the	World	Bank,	or	the	donor	community,	or	the	international	community,	as	a	good	object,	and	it	has	buy-in	from	far	beyond	its	employees.			
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What	is	being	defended	against?	Bhabha’s	answer	relates	to	the	inherent	ambivalence	at	the	heart	of	liberalism	itself	–	liberalism,	he	argues,	presents	an	idealized	representation	of	a	universal	pure	project,	to	paper	over	the	internal	confusion	and	a	hidden	terror	of	the	colonial	project.	In	this	particular	case,	we	might	point	to	the	ambiguities	and	problems	at	the	heart	of	the	World	Bank	project	itself,	particularly	to	policy	failures	like	its	structural	adjustment	programmes.	The	ideal	of	the	Bank	as	an	apolitical,	benign	actor	pursuing	a	rational,	incontestable	normative	project	suffered	a	severe	shock	in	the	now	widely	recognized	failure	of	the	programmes.	But	perhaps	more	fundamental	is	the	idea	of	the	subject	as	inherently	troubled	by	ambiguity,	something	that	is	writ-large	in	groups	and	organizations	that	carry	and	multiply	anxieties.	Collectively,	Western	subjects	have	tried	to	overcome	this	by	searching	for	a	universalizing	project,	an	idealized	form	of	government	over	an	idealized	population.	This	final	point	underlines	a	gloomy	prognosis.	Bhabha	argues	that	there	is	no	‘passage	from	trauma	to	transcendence…	[because]	both	colonizer	and	colonized	are	in	a	process	of	misrecognition	where	each	point	of	identification	is	always	partial	and	double	repetition	of	the	otherness	of	the	self	–	democrat	and	despot,	individual	and	servant,	native	and	child’	(1994:	138-9).	There	is	scant	possibility	that	the	World	Bank	can	‘grow	up’	or	begin	to	recognize	its	ambivalence:	there	is	simply	too	much	at	stake.	
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